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Abstract
The unique “Swiss way” of association with the European Union (EU) has received increasing attention in light of recent
events such as Brexit as it is based on sectoral agreements without an overarching institutional framework. As such, Eu-
ropeanization of Swiss domestic policy does not follow a straightforward process. We examine the external governance
processes that drive the Europeanization of Swiss energy policy. Switzerland and the EU are highly interdependent in
energy due to Switzerland’s geographical position but there is a relatively low level of policy alignment, as there is no for-
mal EU-Swiss energy agreement nor has Switzerland autonomously implemented legislation equivalent to the EU energy
acquis. The EU has fully liberalized the energy market and is focusing on consumer empowerment and decarbonization
through the Clean Energy Package, whereas the Swiss energy sector remains only partially liberalized. Through a series of
expert interviews with key stakeholders, we reconstruct the historical developments in Swiss energy policy, focusing on
the relationship with, and the influence of the EU. We observe elements of each of the three ideal modes of governance—
markets, hierarchies, and networks. The relative importance of these modes of coordination in governing EU-Swiss energy
relations has shifted considerably over time. Gradual harmonization of EU energy markets and certain key events have
driven Swiss exclusion from EU network governance processes, leading to more hierarchy. We identify the strengths and
weaknesses of each mode of governance for EU-Swiss energy relations in their historical setting and discuss the implica-
tions for energy policy in Switzerland in the context of the Clean Energy Package and EU external relations in general.
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1. Introduction
The European Union (EU) associates with third countries
in a variety of manners (Lavenex, Lemkuhl, &Wichmann,
2009). The unique “Swiss way” of association has re-
ceived increasing attention in the context of Brexit be-
cause Switzerland has no institutional framework agree-
ment with the EU (Tobler, 2016). The EU-Swiss rela-
tionship is defined by sectoral agreements. Additionally,
Switzerland has significantly aligned its domestic legis-
lation with the EU in certain sectors without a formal
agreement. There have been various quantitative stud-
ies on the influence of EU policy on Swiss policy (Bartle,
2006; Gava & Varone, 2014; Jenni, 2015). However, few
analyze the governance processes that drive such adap-
tation. Identifying these processes is important because
the absence of an institutional agreement between the
EU and Switzerland implies a lack of standard procedures
of association and could provide insight into future rela-
tions between the EU and other countries.
The case of electricity is particularly pertinent as
the reliable operation of an electricity system requires
the continuous cooperation of all parties involved. How-
ever, there is no formal EU-Swiss agreement on electric-
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ity. European energy affairs have traditionally been co-
ordinated through various private and public networks
(Jegen, 2009), yet, Switzerland’s position in these net-
works has significantly deteriorated the last few decades,
up to the point of exclusion in certain instances (Jenni,
2015). At the same time, Switzerland has committed
to an ambitious energy transition focusing on the grad-
ual phasing-out of nuclear energy, the most important
source of electricity besides hydropower, which will
likely increase its future dependence on the EU electric-
ity system (Demiray et al., 2018; ElCom, 2018; Verhoog,
van Baal, & Finger, 2018).
Research on policy diffusion tells us that uncoor-
dinated, unilateral adoption of EU-compatible policies
in Switzerland can result from either competitive or
coercive pressure, or through learning and emulation
(Börzel & Risse, 2011; Elkins & Simmons, 2005; Simmons,
Dobbin, & Garret, 2006). The EU external governance lit-
erature started from the observation that the EU sphere
of influence extends beyond its Member States (Friis &
Murphy, 1999) and has proven successful in explaining
Europeanization processes (Lavenex, 2004; Mugyenzi,
2015; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). Both pol-
icy diffusion and external governance use ‘conditionality’
as a key mechanism driving policy proliferation in third
countries. However, unlike policy diffusion, external gov-
ernance theory is not limited to the implementation of
policies but includes other forms of coordination as well,
often studying these in light of the traditional ‘modes’
of governance—markets, hierarchy, and networks (see,
e.g., Knill & Tosun, 2009). Joint operation of the Euro-
pean power system requires continuous coordination be-
tween all countries involved, and external governance
theory allows us to analyze all the governance processes
involved. We use the external governance theoretical
framework which was originally defined by Lavenex and
Schimmelfennig (2009) to analyze the processes that
drive the Europeanization of Swiss energy policy. The
framework was developed specifically in a European con-
text and offers several explanatory hypotheses regard-
ing power relations, domestic structures, and EU insti-
tutions. As EU external governance modes are strongly
path- and sector-dependent (Lavenex, Lemkuhl, et al.,
2009), we have to look at how the current situation has
developed to discuss the future implications for Euro-
pean integration.
We, therefore, reconstruct the history of EU-Swiss
energy governance by utilizing public reports, press re-
leases and official government publications, alongside
thirteen interviewswith key stakeholders. All of the stake-
holders interviewedwere directly involvedwith EU-Swiss
(energy) affairs at a certain point in the history. We in-
terviewed seven high-ranking public administration of-
ficials, two diplomats, and four business leaders. The
stakeholder selection was made by mapping from the
documentary sources and a snowball approach during
the interview process. We took efforts to include critical
voices and to balance European and Swiss perspectives.
Although the interviews were a primary source of infor-
mation, we triangulated the information obtained with
official documents and research reports for accuracy and
reliability. Interviews are cited in-text as CH# or EU# and
refer to a specific Swiss or EU interviewee, respectively.
Anonymity was promised to all participants due to the
current political sensitivity of EU-Swiss relations.
Section 2 explains the modes of external governance
and relevant hypotheses in further detail. Section 3 and 4
describe the key elements of European and Swiss energy
history, respectively. Special attention is given to those
developments which have been relevant in the shaping
of EU-Swiss relationship. Section 5 provides a discussion
of these developments using the external governance
framework. The last section summarizes our results and
provides a perspective on the future of EU-Swiss en-
ergy relations.
2. Modes of External Governance
Williamson (1975) defined markets and hierarchies as
distinct ‘modes of governance’, based on dispersed com-
petition and hierarchical control, respectively. Later re-
searchers pointed to networks as an additional mode
of governance, based on reciprocal patterns of com-
munication and exchange, contrasting and competing
withmarkets and hierarchies (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti,
1997; Powell, 1990). Although this governance approach
was traditionally applied to internal governance, Lavenex
(2004, p. 682) argued that the governance approach is
particularly useful for studying EU external relations be-
cause of its emphasis on hierarchical and horizontal, for-
mal and informal forms of policymaking. EU external gov-
ernance has been defined as “institutionalized forms of
coordinated action that aim at the production of collec-
tively binding agreements…beyond the borders of the
EU and its formal, legal authority” (Lavenex & Schim-
melfennig, 2009, p. 795). Using this definition, Lavenex
and Schimmelfennig (2009) further defined the three
ideal modes of governance in the context of EU exter-
nal relations.
They firstly define hierarchical governance as a for-
malized, asymmetrical relationship based on the princi-
ple of domination and subordination, enforced through
legally binding, non-negotiable legislation. They argue
that the traditional form of hierarchy is never strictly
present in an EU external governance context, as third
countries retain formal sovereignty. Nonetheless, certain
parts of EU external governance come close to this mode
of governance, such as the European Economic Area
(EEA) overarching framework agreement. They point to
the existence of precise rules, formal procedures, moni-
toring, and sanctioning as indicators of hierarchy.
Secondly, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) define
network governance as institutionalized, ongoing coor-
dination, both formal and informal. Actors are formally
equal, even if power imbalances exist, as no party is
able to formally bind the other party without their con-
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sent. The presence of central institutions is a strong in-
dicator of EU network governance, but network gover-
nance can also exist without a central institution (Provan
& Kenis, 2008).
Thirdly, they define market governance as the out-
come of competition between formally autonomous ac-
tors. In the context of EU external relations, this can be
best seen by the competitive pressure of the Single Mar-
ket. Competitive forces can drive an approximation of EU
legislation or the adoption of EU standards in third coun-
tries, even without a formal requirement. This conceptu-
alization of market governance invokes similar principles
as described in the policy diffusion literature (see, e.g.,
Simmons et al., 2006), as the outcomes are the result of
unilateral decisions of third countries in order to gain or
avoid material consequences.
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) offer several hy-
potheses as to why certain governance forms become
dominant. Observing that themodeof governance varies
with structures of power relations and levels of inter-
dependence, they hypothesize that an asymmetrical,
high interdependence tends to favour hierarchical gov-
ernance, whereas symmetrical, strong interdependence
is most conducive to market governance. Network gov-
ernance arises in situations with medium interdepen-
dence. In our analysis, we will examine whether these
hypotheses hold in the case of EU-Swiss bilateralism in
the area of energy. Table 1 summarizes the three modes
of governance.
3. European Energy History
The history of European energy policy has been de-
scribed by many authors (e.g., Hancher, 1997; Jevnaker,
2015; Meeus, Purchala, & Belmans, 2005; Vasconcelos,
2005). This section will not provide a detailed account of
EU energy policy development but rather highlight the
most relevant aspects of the relationship with Switzer-
land. Figure 1 shows an overview of the most pertinent
events and legislation.
3.1. Transit Directives and First Energy Package
The EU took the first step towards the internal energymar-
ket (IEM) by passing the Directives on the Transit of Elec-
tricity and Gas in 1990 and 1991, respectively (Nylander,
2001). These “Transit Directives” askedMember States to
facilitate cross-border trade, without, however, specify-
ing how. Further legislation was necessary to integrate
the energy markets. In 1996, the first Electricity Direc-
tive was adopted; the first Gas Directive followed in 1998.
This first “Energy Package” mandated legal unbundling, a
transmission system operator, and the gradual opening
of markets to competition (Meeus et al., 2005). Notably
absent was a compensation mechanism for cross-border
trading, which was to be settled bilaterally.
Aware of the regulatory gaps created by the first En-
ergy Package, the European Commission (EC) convened
the first Florence Forum in 1998 (Vasconcelos, 2005,
Table 1. Structural modes of EU external governance. Adapted from Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009).
Actor constellation Institutionalization Mechanism of rule expansion Interdependence
Hierarchy Vertical: domination Tight, formal Harmonization High, asymmetrical
and subordination
Network Horizontal: formal Medium-tight, both Coordination, negotiation Medium, symmetrical
equality of partners formal and informal or asymmetrical
Market Horizontal: formal Loose, informal Competition, market High, symmetrical
equality of partners pressure
Note: the last column assumes the mode of governance is primarily determined by power relations.
Figure 1. Timeline of relevant energy history of the EU (below) and Switzerland (above).
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p. 90), which brought together all relevant stakeholders
to devise regulatory solutions through consensus build-
ing. New organizations were created to facilitate this pro-
cess. Examples include the Council of European Energy
Regulators (CEER) and the Association of European Trans-
mission System Operators (ETSO). Their first task was to
define a mechanism for cross-border trade. In 2000, a
solution was developed and presented to the EC: cross-
border trades would be settled through inter-TSO com-
pensation (ITC), considering only physical flows and com-
pensating transit countries such as Switzerland. How-
ever, adoption of this solution was delayed until 2003
due to fierce opposition mainly by the German govern-
ment (Vasconcelos, 2005, p. 91).
3.2. Second Energy Package
Unsatisfied with the pace of liberalization and the re-
maining regulatory gaps (Jevnaker, 2015, p. 934), the EU
adopted the second Energy Package in 2003. The legisla-
tive package mandated full market opening for all cus-
tomers across the EU, stronger network access regula-
tion, as well as the establishment of an independent reg-
ulator. It also created the European Regulators Group for
Electricity andGas (ERGEG),whichwas largely equivalent
to the CEER but included the EC as an observing, non-
voting member (Coen & Thatcher, 2008).
3.3. Third Energy Package and Network Codes
The newly established ERGEG had almost no formal
power (Coen & Thatcher, 2008) and adoption of the
agreed regulatory solutions remained voluntary, which
the EC considered inadequate (Jevnaker, 2015, p. 934).
The solutions it provided were unclear and significant
regulatory gaps remained across the IEM, especially re-
garding cross-border mechanisms. A third Energy Pack-
age aimed to solve these problems in 2009 through
stronger EU-level governance and centralized coopera-
tion (Jevnaker, 2015, p. 935). The Agency for the Coop-
eration of Energy Regulators (ACER) was created to suc-
ceed the ERGEG and the European Network of Trans-
mission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) to
succeed the ETSO and the Union for the Coordination
of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE). These organiza-
tions institutionalized the informal power held by their
predecessors. A new legislative process was started be-
tween ENTSO-E and ACER to develop the Network Codes
(NCs)—binding standards on operation, connection and
market conditions (Jevnaker, 2015, p. 928).
3.4. Clean Energy Package
The three Energy Packages had mostly focused on lib-
eralization, integration, and security of supply. Climate
and sustainability concerns were addressed by separate
legislative packages. Proposed by the EC in November
2016, the Clean Energy Package (CEP) harmonizes cli-
mate and sustainability with the rest of EU energy policy.
Besides updating the targets for the 2030 horizon, the
CEP legally defines new types of actors such as aggrega-
tors and local energy communities, expands themandate
of ACER, proposes an EU distribution system operator
(DSO) entity, and expands the scope of the NCs (Meeus
& Nouicer, 2018).
4. Swiss Energy History
4.1. Before 1990
Switzerland was a main driver of European integration in
the electricity sector as a founding member of the Union
for the Coordination of Production and Transmission of
Electricity (UCPTE)1. In 1958, the “Star of Laufenburg”
substation was commissioned in the Canton of Aargau,
connecting the electricity grids of Switzerland, France,
and Germany for the first time. The UCPTE grid grew
rapidly and by 1996 it crossed 19 European countries
fromPoland to Portugal, with the Laufenburg control cen-
tre still at its core (UCTE, 2009). The Swiss companies
in the UCPTE were influential and were not restrained
by the Swiss national authorities. Although national gov-
ernments sometimes sent delegates to UCPTE meetings
(CH1), they held no formal power within the organization.
4.2. 1990 to 2003
In 1990, the Swiss public voted overwhelmingly in favour
of giving the national government a constitutional en-
ergy mandate, which had previously been a mostly can-
tonal affair. In this period, the Swiss economy was stag-
nating, and following a referendum rejecting EEA mem-
bership in 1992, the Swiss government was exploring
new ways to stimulate the economy. It was clear from
the European side that the future of the electricity sec-
tor was going to be liberalized, unbundled, and competi-
tive. Notable publications fromde Pury (1995) and Cattin
(1995) garnered significant media and political attention
by highlighting the economic benefits of liberalization in
Switzerland (CH1). A liberalization law, called the Elec-
tricity Market Law (EMG), was being drafted based on
the recommendations of the Cattin report (Jegen, 2009).
Although economic benefits were a main driver for the
EMG, it was developed in line with the first Energy Pack-
age to ensure EU-compatibility and maintain market ac-
cess (Jegen & Wüstenhagen, 2001).
When the Florence Forum convened for the first time
in 1998, the participating stakeholder organizationswere
not official EU institutions, and therefore membership
was not strictly reserved to EU Member States. Thus,
Swiss delegates were able to participate, unlike in the
formal EU legislative process. Switzerland had less influ-
ence in the Florence Forum than it did in the UCPTE, but
was able to participate and represent its interests. For in-
1 The UCPTE changed its name to UCTE in 1999, dropping the “P” for production (UCTE, 2009).
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stance, the ITC solution proposed by the Florence Forum
was co-developed and strongly advocated for by Swiss
representatives as it favoured transit countries (CH6). Be-
cause there was no formal TSO or regulator in Switzer-
land, the electricity companies and the government sent
delegates to represent these roles. Their European coun-
terparts mostly accepted this, as long as they did not
push their conflicting interests too strongly (CH6). It was
the same for several EUMember States—not all of them
had a regulator or had fully unbundled their companies.
The credibility of Swiss actors in the Florence processwas
based on skilled diplomacy and on the “promise” that EU-
compatible domestic legislation was in development, in-
tegration would proceed, and that their presence in Flo-
rence was therefore needed (CH6).
The seven Swiss electricity companies that owned the
high-voltage transmission grid set up ETRANS in 1999, an
organization taking on the role of national grid operator.
Creating ETRANS allowed the companies to retain owner-
ship of their assets, as ETRANS merely coordinated their
work centrally. The companies had openly been against
the creation of a national grid company, afraid of losing
ownership of their valuable grid assets (Bartle, 2006).
The EMGwas rejected by referendum in 2002 (Jegen,
2009, p. 584). While the opposition did not appeal to
an anti-European sentiment, the rejection could still be
seen as a Eurosceptic outcome as the EMG was meant
to streamline Swiss domestic policy with the EU. Regard-
less, the rejection did not elicit a strong reaction from
the EU (CH1). Switzerland was still seen as a reliable
country. The first Energy Package was a sort of “menu”
approach where each Member State had a significant
choice on how to direct their internal affairs (Hancher,
1997, p. 101). Hence, regulatory gaps were common-
place within internal EU borders and Switzerland, as an
isolated case, did not raise too many concerns at that
point. Additionally, technical compatibility, including re-
garding security measures, was assumed to be ensured
through the UCTE.
4.3. 2003 to 2014
An Italian blackout originating on the Swiss border in
2003 changed the political landscape. The blackout had
an immense effect: 56 million people were left without
electricity for up to 19 hours, with economic damage es-
timated at about €1.2 billion (Walker, Cox, Loughhead, &
Roberts, 2014, p. 17). Switzerland was heavily criticized
for not responding to thewarning signals in a timelyman-
ner, as well as for not having a properly unbundled TSO
(CH6; EU3). However, an official investigation showed
that Switzerland had not broken UCTE rules and could
thus not be held accountable for damages (UCTE, 2004).
Regardless, it became clear that the UCTE rules were not
strict enough to guarantee reliability, and that reliability
depended on Swiss participation.
In April 2004, the Swiss companies voluntarily agreed
to merge the seven transmission grids into a single con-
trol area under control of Swissgrid, a Swiss TSO (d’Arcy
& Finger, 2014). This was not only in response to the Eu-
ropean criticism but also in anticipation of a new domes-
tic liberalization law which was sure to include a require-
ment for a Swiss TSO. By forming Swissgrid on their own
terms, they could determine their own rules. Rather than
owning the transmission grid directly, the companies
took ownership of Swissgrid—it thus remains an imper-
fectly unbundled grid operator (d’Arcy & Finger, 2014).
Even though the first liberalization law was rejected
in 2002, the Federal Tribunal ruled in 2003 that the car-
tel law de facto necessitated liberalization (Bellanger &
Cavaleri Rudaz, 2006, p. 197). This allowed the govern-
ment to propose a new liberalization law—the Electric-
ity Supply Act (StromVG)—which passed in 2007 (Jegen,
2009, p. 584). It called for the opening of the market in
two steps, the creation of a national regulatory author-
ity (ElCom), and a national grid operator (Swissgrid). The
electricity market was opened to all consumers with an
annual consumption higher than 100 MWh in 2009 (Fed-
eral Council [FC], 2013). There was no referendum for
the StromVG, primarily because the second liberalization
step would be subject to a possible referendum.
After the blackout, calls for stricter coordination
with Switzerland intensified on both sides (CH6; CH7;
EU1; EU2). Formal negotiations for a bilateral agreement
on electricity started in 2007 (EC, 2007). The negotia-
tions, although slow, were happening in good faith as
the recent Swiss developments had consistently been
EU-compatible. Pragmatism directed this indirect Euro-
peanization: the changes not only aided in the overall
security of supply and economic efficiency through en-
hanced EU-compatibility, but it also created goodwill by
preparing for the implementation of the electricity agree-
ment under negotiation.
Regardless of these domestic developments and the
ongoing negotiations, Switzerland was slowly becoming
less influential in European energy affairs. The second
and third Energy Packages and subsequent creation of
ERGEG and ACER in 2003 and 2009, respectively, insti-
tutionalized the network governance approach started
by the EC with the Florence Forum after the first Energy
Package. These organizations were now official EU orga-
nizations and therefore less open to delegates of non-
Member States. This also held true for the programs that
they launched, such as the Regional Initiatives, for which
Switzerland was only an observer country (Jegen, 2009,
p. 591). Nonetheless, when ENTSOE was created, Swiss-
grid was allowed to become a member as it had tradi-
tionally been a member of the UCTE which ENTSO-E suc-
ceeded. Through ENTSO-E, Swissgrid participated in the
development of the NCs.
4.4. 2014 to Present
In 2014, eleven years after the Italian blackout and fol-
lowing seven years of formal bilateral negotiations, the
end of the negotiations was in sight, with a verbal con-
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sensus having been achieved regarding many of the is-
sues on the table (CH5). However, all negotiations were
halted in 2014 when the Swiss population voted to limit
immigration from all EU countries (Jenni, 2016, p. 284).
This was in direct opposition to the Agreement on the
Free Movement of People (AFMP) signed a decade ear-
lier. The EC put all bilateral negotiations, including those
on the electricity agreement, on hold pending on how
the government decided to implement the referendum
results (EC, 2014). Most EU-Swiss agreements contain
guillotine clauses, meaning they can all be terminated if
one party terminates a single agreement.
The political relationship with Switzerland became
strained (CH5; EU3). When the first NCs came into force,
they had an ultimatum for Switzerland: until a bilateral
electricity agreement was signed, Switzerland would be
excluded from participating in the intraday, day-ahead,
and balancing market coupling mechanisms of the EU2.
Besides a loss of market opportunities, this exclusion
caused an increase in unscheduled loop flows and a sub-
sequent need for re-dispatching in Switzerland (Swiss-
grid, 2018).
In 2016, Switzerland implemented an AFMP-
compatible version of the immigration bill in order to
appease the EU (FC, 2016). The open dossiers could be
picked up again (EC, 2016). However, the relationship
had changed drastically (CH5). Switzerland had become
acutely aware of its dependency on the EU, and the EU
was not sure how to deal with Switzerland. It was not in
their interest to break all ties with Switzerland, however,
they wanted to make clear that the agreements were
an “all or nothing” package. The EU was dealing with
several crises—a dragging economic crisis, the refugee
crisis, and Brexit. Uncertainty in the relationship with
Switzerland was far from desirable and the EU could not
set a soft precedent in light of Brexit (Brunsden & Atkins,
2018). A sentiment of distrust had also grown in Brus-
sels regarding Swiss politicians, as their promises and
any agreements were limited by federal competencies
and the possibility for referenda (CH5). Even though it
was not formally ended at the time, the EU had already
signalled back in 2008 that the unique “Swiss way” of
association based on bilateral agreements was reaching
its limits (Council of the European Union, 2014). Prelimi-
nary negotiations on an institutional framework started
in 2011 (FC, 2011). However, after the 2014 referendum,
all open dossiers became conditional on the institutional
framework negotiations, including the electricity agree-
ment (CH5).
Prior to 1990, when the EU started legislating,
Switzerland was central and influential in European en-
ergy affairs. This stands in stark contrast to the situation
in 2018, when it had become excluded from influential
organizations and market mechanisms. Gradual EU insti-
tutionalization and key events such as the 2003 black-
out and 2014 referendum were the main contributors.
This deterioration of the Swiss position has gone hand in
hand with a shift in the power balance. Whereas in previ-
ous decades the EU wanted an agreement with Switzer-
land because of its strong interconnection and valuable
hydropower resources, it is now Switzerland that needs
an agreement with the EU. Deteriorating market access
could have real consequences for Swiss security of sup-
ply, while EU countries are gradually increasing their in-
terconnection (EC, 2017), making Switzerland less essen-
tial as a transit country.
Contemporary Swiss energy policy is focused around
the Energy Strategy 2050 (ES50). Passed by referendum
in 2017, the legislative package embodies the Swiss sus-
tainability transition: gradually phasing-out nuclear en-
ergy while supporting renewables and energy efficiency
(FC, 2017). This nuclear phase-out is likely to increase
Swiss reliance on electricity imports, both seasonal and
annual, further exacerbating this shift in power (Demiray
et al., 2018; ElCom, 2018; Verhoog, van Baal, & Finger,
2017). In comparison to the CEP, which is a broad legisla-
tive package focusing on consumer empowerment, secu-
rity of supply, energy market design, as well as climate
and sustainability goals, the ES50 is more limited as it
focuses solely on the latter. A revision of the StromVG,
for which the parliamentary process started in 2018, is
scheduled to address those other issues (FC, 2018).
5. Discussion
5.1. Networks
Network governance can be seen early on in European
energy affairs. The creation of the UCPTE, a network ad-
ministrative organization, by the electricity companies,
is a clear sign of network governance (Provan & Kenis,
2008). This organization was coordinating the European
power grid long before the EU became involved. The
UCPTE’s rapid growth and the duration of its existence
is a clear sign of the success of this type of coordination.
Network governance continued to be the preferred
method of governance for the EU when it began legis-
lating the energy markets. The consecutive energy pack-
ages gradually institutionalized the network governance
mechanisms. Jegen (2009) shows that this institutional-
ization has progressively made it harder for Switzerland
to participate. However, we observe an overall trend of
increasing hierarchy as well, with EU legislation increas-
ingly taking over network functions.
The Transit Directives, and to a certain degree the
first Energy Package, contained few binding rules and left
the Member States ample choice to coordinate and im-
plement their ownprocedures and standards. TheUCPTE
was in the ideal position to take a leading position but
failed to do so to a sufficient extent. The creation of
the Florence Forum by the EC was meant to find regula-
tory solutions through network governance. The volun-
tary rule-creation in Florence was still open to represen-
tatives of invited third countries. Swiss companies, repre-
2 See art. 1(6) of the Electricity Balancing Guideline and art. 1(4) of the Guideline on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management.
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sented through ETRANS, were successfully able to repre-
sent their interests. However, the participants in the Flo-
rence Forum failed to reach consensus on the ITC, and
the EU subsequently felt compelled to enforce the mea-
sure in the second Energy Package.
The 2003 blackout further showed that weak forms
of coordination were not sufficient to ensure reliability
in the increasingly complex grid. The EU intervened with
the third Energy Package by creating a new organiza-
tion, ENTSO-E, to take over the functions of the UCTE
and ETSO. If the companies in those organizations had
committed to binding technical rules through the UCTE,
perhaps this would not have been necessary. The UCTE
was a loose form of collaboration relying more on mu-
tual trust than binding rules. Even though ENTSO-E is
still a network organization, it is an EU agency mandated
to create legally binding rules and procedures, introduc-
ing more hierarchy into the network. The first NCs—
developed by ENTSO-E and ACER—excluded Switzerland
from participation in several market mechanisms.
The formation of Swissgrid, in the wake of the Ital-
ian blackout, was a clear signal of network governance as
well. Although therewas no clear hierarchy enforcing the
creation of a TSO, the criticism endured from other net-
work participants—at the Florence Forum and through
the UCTE—spurred this approximation of EU energy pol-
icy, even in the absence of domestic legislation. Much of
thework that Swissgrid has done in the subsequent years
to coordinate technical affairs through ENTSO-E can be
attributed to network governance as well.
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) postulate that
network governance is most favoured in situations of
medium interdependence, both in asymmetric as well
as symmetric power relations, which seems to be consis-
tent with our observations. Interdependence of the Eu-
ropean electricity markets has grown continuously, both
physically and economically, and as a result, pure net-
work solutions were no longer deemed sufficient or op-
timal, leading the EU to introduce governance processes
that were more hierarchical in nature.
5.2. Markets
Jegen (2009) argues that Swiss companies’ successful
participation in UCTE and ETSO is a form of market gov-
ernance which at least partially compensates for the de-
cline in their influence over the increasing institution-
alization of EU energy policy. We argue this is not a
form of market governance, driven by dispersed com-
petition, but rather a form of network governance as it
results from ongoing multilateral coordination through
a central organization. The Swiss network participants
are predominantly market actors but that does not im-
ply competitive pressure is de facto the driving mode
of governance.
Markets have rarely been the dominant mode of gov-
ernance in EU-Swiss energy relations. Throughout most
of the 20th century, energy companies remained verti-
cally integrated companies. Since their monopolies were
often legally protected, there was no competitive pres-
sure that could incite any approach of EU-Swiss legis-
lation. Rather, network governance coordinated the re-
lations between companies through the UCTE as soon
as trade became possible, due to the complexity of the
physical infrastructure.
Nonetheless, when EU Member States started open-
ing their electricity markets and breaking monopolies,
competitive pressure arrived. One of the strongest ratio-
nales for the first liberalization law in Switzerland was EU
compatibility to ensure market access (Jegen & Wüsten-
hagen, 2001). Even though it was ultimately rejected,
and liberalization did not arrive in Switzerland at that
time, the Swiss companies felt compelled to change their
businessmodel. The formation of ETRANS is a clear exam-
ple. The Laufenburg control centre had historically been
operated by EGL who therefore had longstanding rela-
tionships with foreign electricity companies. The other
Swiss companies were afraid that these business rela-
tionships would become a significant competitive advan-
tage for EGL once they were able to start trading across
Europe (CH6). The Swiss companies were therefore in
favour of creating ETRANS, as the control centre would
come under the control of all seven companies. This deci-
sionwas not negotiatedwith any EU authority or through
any network. Market pressure spurred this form of adap-
tation to EU energy policy in the absence of any hierarchy
or network.
Other examples of adaptation to EU energy policy
can be attributed, at least partly, to market pressure.
Examples include the EU-compatible provisions of the
StromVG and the introduction of a power exchange in
Switzerland. This does not preclude domestic affairs be-
ing the main driver of these developments but merely
points to the presence of economic pressure as a con-
tributing factor. A common factor is asymmetry, as it has
consistently been Switzerland which has followed EU de-
velopments, contradicting the hypothesis of Lavenex and
Schimmelfennig (2009) that market governance stems
from symmetrical power relations.
5.3. Hierarchies
Negotiated bilateralism was established as the mode
of EU-Swiss coordination after Switzerland rejected
EEA membership in 1992. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig
(2009) would argue that this is a form of network gover-
nance, as both actors retain formal sovereignty and rule
expansion is based on mutual consent. However, we ar-
gue that Swiss bilateralism has evolved into a type of hi-
erarchical governance.When the Swiss population voted
to restrict immigration in 2014, the guillotine clauses in
the bilateral agreements acted as a way to enforce com-
pliance. Formally speaking, Switzerland could have im-
plemented immigration quotas for EU nationals as the
referendum demanded, but this would have broken all
bilateral agreements with the EU and therefore Switzer-
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land refrained. The EU relationship has become an “all
or nothing” package akin to the EEA or even EUmember-
ship itself, as Brexit has demonstrated. The asymmetrical
power balance between Switzerland and the EU has de-
veloped into a form of hierarchical governance in those
areas where bilateral agreements have been signed.
The negotiations for such an agreement in electricity
have been ongoing since 2007. If successful, the scope of
this hierarchywill be extended to electricity. Even though
EU legislation has no formal power over Switzerland, re-
cent EU energy legislation tries to pressure Switzerland
to comply regardless—a sign that hierarchy is being es-
tablished. The NCs exert strong market pressure by ex-
plicitly excluding Switzerland from market coupling on
the intraday, day-ahead, and balancing markets until an
agreement is signed. Market pressure has been a strong
motivation for Switzerland to pass EU-compatible leg-
islation in the past, as described in the previous sec-
tion. The NCs also contain technical standards which for
Switzerland are practically impossible not to follow due
to its physical integration into the European power grid.
This trend of increasing hierarchy, also briefly hinted
at in section 5.1, is consistent with the hypothesis of
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) that high, asymmet-
rical interdependence tends to favour hierarchical exter-
nal governance.
6. Conclusion
We examined Swiss-EU bilateralism in energy as a case
for EU external governance. This section will summarize
our main findings as well as provide a discussion on the
implications for future EU-Swiss relations and EU exter-
nal governance.
European energy affairs have historically been coordi-
nated through network governance. EU modes of exter-
nal governance are strongly path-dependent (Lavenex,
Lemkuhl, et al., 2009), as can be seen in energy. Net-
work governance remained the dominant mode of co-
ordination when the EU started legislating. However,
the trend towards hierarchy is clear in both EU inter-
nal and external governance. Other researchers have
similarly pointed out that even though the EU institu-
tionalized network governance, it has retained formal
power and hierarchically enforces compliance (Coen &
Thatcher, 2008; Eberlein & Grande, 2005). This trend
has continued with the subsequent passing of new EU
energy legislation. This steady march of institutionaliza-
tion of the EU energy market has made the relationship
with Switzerland increasingly asymmetric, and we ob-
serve a consequentmarginalization of the role of Switzer-
land in European network governance, in which it had
traditionally held a central role. Key events such as the
2003 Italian blackout and 2014 immigration referendum
further contributed to these shifts in the mode of gov-
ernance. These findings are consistent with the power-
based hypotheses of Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009)
concerning hierarchy and networks as modes of external
governance, favouring hierarchy when interdependence
is higher and asymmetric. Nonetheless, only network
governance provides an organizational opening for the
inclusion of third countries in the policy process of the
EU, as hierarchy assumes an institutional relationship—
which Switzerland formally does not have—and the im-
plied absence of hierarchy in market governance pre-
cludes organizational inclusion.
The ongoing negotiations present an opportunity as
well as a risk to Switzerland. The risk lies in deepening
the hierarchical relationship that has emerged over the
years, following the trend of hierarchy seen in internal
EU affairs. If an agreement is signed on electricity, with
or without an institutional framework agreement, it will
likely contain an explicit or implicit guillotine clause link-
ing it to the existing bilateral agreements, further de-
veloping the hierarchical relationship. However, the op-
portunity lies in the re-integration into the network gov-
ernance mechanisms of the EU, in which it has histori-
cally been particularly capable in advocating its interests.
The CEP expands the scope of the NCs, which are nego-
tiated and drafted by the central institutions ENTSO-E
and ACER. The CEP further proposes the creation of a
DSO-entity that will also participate in the creation of the
NCs (Meeus & Nouicer, 2018). Participation and voting
rights in ACER and the new DSO-entity would integrate
Switzerland into these legislative processes. Such inclu-
sionwill only be possible through an agreement between
the EU and Switzerland. The interdependence of the EU
and Swiss energy sectors will mean the second genera-
tion of NCs will have a similarly strong impact on Switzer-
land as the first generation, regardless of whether or not
an agreement is signed.
Exclusion has not only diminished Swiss influence on
legislative processes but also its market access. Histori-
cally, market pressure was a strong driver for Switzerland
to unilaterally adopt EU-compatible legislation. The in-
creasingly asymmetrical power balance between the EU
and Switzerland makes it hard for Switzerland to resist
such pressure and it is therefore likely that this will im-
pact the future relationship.
However, the CEP is not included in the negotiation
mandate for the EU-Swiss electricity agreement. The ne-
gotiation mandate was originally based on the second
Energy Package but was extended to include the third
Energy Package in 2010 (FC, 2010), therefore it is possi-
ble the CEP is added at a later stage. Regardless, the sec-
ond generation of NCs it proposes will be coordinated
through the network agencies into which Switzerland
could become a member. Thus, even if the agreement
does not include the CEP, it would be able to participate
in the legislative process.
It is unlikely that Switzerland will implement the CEP
provisions without an agreement. Swiss and EU energy
policy has increasingly diverged since the passage of
the third Energy Package, and this trend will likely con-
tinue if no agreement is signed. The second generation
of NCs might contain exclusion provisions, as has been
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the case with the first generation. The past rationale to
autonomously adopt EU-compatible legislation was, for
themost part, to ensure technical compatibility andmar-
ket access. However, such incentives are not provided
by the CEP. The way forward for EU-Swiss bilateralism
thus remains politically uncertain. However, it is clear
that the question of whether or not Switzerland will fur-
ther diverge or integrate into the EU energy markets will
depend on general EU-Swiss relations more than sec-
toral dynamics.
Although not the topic of this study, our findings have
implications for the relations of other third countries
with the EU. The harmonization and institutionalization
of the internal market, one of the core missions of EU in-
ternal policy, has given the EU increasing leverage in its
relations with neighbouring countries. Membership con-
ditionality is no longer the strongest leverage over gover-
nance processes the EU has in its association with third
countries.Membership in various network organizations,
such as ACER or ENTSO-E in energy, and participation in
pan-European policy initiatives such as electricitymarket
coupling platforms, might be a stronger influencing fac-
tor than EU membership for countries without EU mem-
bership aspirations such as the UK or Switzerland. This in-
creasingly asymmetric relationship means external gov-
ernance processes will be more hierarchical and thus ex-
ceptions are less likely to be granted in future bilateral ne-
gotiations. The “Swiss way” of EU association wasmostly
negotiated in a time when the EU internal market was
not as advanced as it is today and can be considered an
artefact rather than a realistic option for other countries.
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